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INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT
FOR THE "COELHO CHALLENGE"
SETH

D. HARRIs*

On March 13, 1998, President Bill Clinton signed Executive
Order No. 13078 creating the National Task Force on the Employment of Adults with Disabilities (PTFEAD). 1 Chaired by Secretary
of Labor Alexis Herman, 2 the Task Force's charge was "to create a
coordinated and aggressive national policy to bring adults with disabilities into gainful employment at a rate that is as close as possible
3
to that of the general adult population."
Ordinarily, presidential directives ordering cabinet officers
and other senior presidential appointees to work together in furtherance of the President's agenda do not warrant close study. But
Executive Order No. 13078 is an exception. This executive order
signaled the beginning of a new phase in the effort to pry open the
door of opportunity for Americans with disabilities.
Former Congressman Tony Coelho, who addressed a large audience of students, faculty, alumni, and disabilities advocates at
New York Law School on October 24, 2003 under the auspices of
New York Law School's Labor & Employment Law Program, was a
central and essential figure in both the phase of disability policy
that preceded Executive Order No. 13078 and the new phase of
disability policy President Clinton's executive order sought to usher
in. Thus, Executive Order No. 13078's small but important role in
the history of federal disability employment policy offers valuable
* © Seth D. Harris. Associate Professor of Law and Director, Labor & Employment Law Program, New York Law School. B.S., Cornell University School of Industrial
& Labor Relations 1983; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1990. My colleagues
Carlin Meyer and Steve Ellman offered helpful comments on an earlier draft. I am
grateful to Amelia Baker, Amanda Gaynor, and Greg Rutstein for their research assistance in the preparation of this introduction. I am also grateful to Rebecca Rossel,
Labor & Employment Law Research Fellow, and Lynn Klugman, Director of Special
Projects, for the essential roles they played in the planning and presentation of Congressman Coelho's address on October 24th, 2003.
1. Exec. Order No. 13078, 63 Fed. Reg. 13111 (March 13, 1998).
2. Id. at § I (b).
3. Id. at § 1 (c).
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insights into the context for Congressman Coelho's address "Our
Right to Work, Our Demand to Be Heard: People with Disabilities,
the 2004 Election, and Beyond."
THE THREE PHASES OF FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY

During the century leading up to President Clinton's executive
order, federal disability employment policy passed through three
phases distinguishable by their diagnoses of the public policy problem to be solved. The earliest phase of federal disability policy - a
"sustenance" phase - took as its premise that people with disabilities could not succeed in mainstream workplaces and, therefore,
needed income support for their sustenance. Thus, state and federal governments (and employers, on occasion) provided cash assistance and other benefits first to Civil War veterans and, later, other
workers with disabilities. State workers' compensation laws enacted
during the Progressive era, and amendments to the Social Security
Act after World War II creating the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income programs, were
4
the most important achievements of this sustenance phase.
The end of World War I commenced a "rehabilitation" phase
that was founded on a different factual premise: people with disabilities could not work because of their physical and mental conditions, but some conditions could be "healed" sufficiently to permit
work. Solving this problem, therefore, required rehabilitating people with disabilities. Accordingly, the federal and state governments provided expanding "vocational rehabilitation" services to
prospective workers with disabilities. 5 Yet, this "rehabilitation"
phase did not supplant the programs, policies, and premises of the
sustenance phase. Rather, the two phases uneasily co-existed without addressing the fundamental contradiction in their views about
4. See Richard K. Scotch, American DisabilityPolicy in the Twentieth Century, in THE
NEW DISABILln' HISTORY 378-81 (Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds. 2001). The
Javits-Wagner-O'Day program and § 14 (c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act offer further
examples of the "sustenance" approach. Since workers with disabilities could not succeed in mainstream workplaces, these two statutes favored "sheltered workshops" and
other segregated workplaces for people with disabilities supported, in part, by specially
set aside government contracts. See Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, 41 U.S.C. § 46 (2003);
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (2003).
5. See Scotch, supra note 4, at 381-83.
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whether people with disabilities could and would succeed in the
workplace.
An "anti-discrimination phase" in federal disability policy and
jurisprudence preceded President Clinton's executive order during
the late 20th Century. Unlike its two predecessors, the anti-discrimination phase took as its premise that discrimination, not the conditions of people with disabilities, played the largest role in blocking
society's entranceway. Thus, the anti-discrimination phase brought
policies based on the view that people with disabilities were entitled
to the same rights as other Americans - enforceable through litigation that would break down societal barriers to full
integration.
For example, two widely followed judicial decisions - Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania6 and Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia7 -

invoked the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' equal protection
and due process clauses to assure children with disabilities access to
public education. This judicial recognition of constitutional protections for schoolchildren with disabilities, in turn, led Congress to
enact the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(EAHCA). The EAHCA established specific statutory protections
designed to integrate children with disabilities into the schools.8
Congress also relied on a rights-based strategy to integrate the
workplace when it enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 9 The
seminal anti-discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act
were quite limited, however, covering only federal employment,
federal contractors, and federal or federally funded programs. 10
Broader protections arrived when Congress enacted the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 - the landmark civil rights legislation
which seemingly guaranteed equal opportunity in all employment,
6. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (threejudge panel) and 343 F. Supp. 279
(E.D. Pa. 1972)(same).
7. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
8. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142
(1975). The EAHCA was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and
reauthorized in 1990. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. 101-476, 104
Stat. 1103 (1990). It was again reauthorized and modified in 1997. Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997).
9. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, P.L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
10. Id. at tit. 7 §§ 501, 503, 504.
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public accommodations, transportation, and other aspects of society.1" Unlike the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA extended its prohibistate and local
tions on discrimination to cover private entities and
12
governments without respect to federal funding.
The anti-discrimination phase left the legislative and programmatic achievements of the sustenance phase and the rehabilitation
phase largely unchanged. 13 As a result, three sets of programs, policies and premises relating to the employment of people with disabilities remained in place, at times frustrating each others' efforts to
achieve sometimes related, sometimes contradictory goals.
Executive Order No. 13078 recognized that, while necessary,
the ADA and the anti-discrimination phase's other constituent parts
would not be sufficient to fully integrate people with disabilities
into American society, especially given that federal policies and programs from the sustenance and rehabilitation phases did not always
serve the same goals. In particular, the goal of substantially increasing the employment of people with disabilities - a central motivating force behind passage of the ADA 14 - did not appear to be any
closer roughly six years after the civil rights law's protections against
employment discrimination had taken effect.1 5 In fact, data from
the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program Participation
show that the employment rate of adults with severe disabilities between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four remained fairly steady at
or around thirty percent through the 1990s, even when the overall
unemployment rate suggested the tightest labor markets in a
16
generation.
11. Americans With Disabilities Act, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2003) (defining "covered entity" as an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee).
13. See generally DUANE F. STROMAN, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION TO SELF-DETERMINATION 75-81 (2003) (collecting 20th Century legislation relating to disabilities).

14. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(8) (2003) (providing that "the Nation's proper goals
regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.").
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (5) (a) (2003) (the effective date of the ADA for employers of 25 employees or more was 1992; the effective date of the ADA for employers of 15
employees or more was 1994).
16. See John M. McNeil, Employment, Earnings, and Disability (2000), available at
(discussing the employhttp://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/emperndis.pdf
ment rate for people with "severe disabilties"). The Census Bureau defines people with
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THE COURSE-CORRECTION PHASE: RE-ENGINEERING
FEDERAL DISABILrrY POLICY

President Clinton's executive order emphasized a different
strategy to address the low employment rate for adults with disabilities. In large part, its new policy direction reflected a different diagnosis of the problem. The ADA adjudged private parties and, to a
lesser extent, state and local governments to be the principal purveyors of the segregation of people with disabilities. 17 The executive order, on the other hand, laid a sizable share of the blame for
the low rate of employment among people with disabilities at the
doorstep of the federal government and its disparate disability policies.1 8 Without expressly rejecting or condemning the remaining
programs from the sustenance and rehabilitation phases, the executive order's substantive agenda focused almost exclusively on re-engineering existing federal policies.' 9 Thus, President Clinton's
"severe disabilities" to include those who are unable to perform one or more functions
of daily living. People with "disabilities" merely have "difficulty" performing one or
more such functions. See Census Brief, DisabilitiesAffect One-Fifth of all Americans, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/97pubs/cenbr975.pdf; see also Monthly Lab.
Rev., Share of Workers Experiencing Unemployment at Record Low (1998), available at http://
www.bls.gov/opub/ted/1998/Dec/wk3/artO3.htm (discussing the overall unemployment rate in the 1990s). The measurement of employment and unemployment among
people with disabilities has posed vexing and complicated definitional as well as statistical problems. As with the ADA, the problem arises with the proper definition of "disability." See generallyJohn M. McNeil, Employment, Earnings, and Disability (2000), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/emperndis.pdf. Executive Order No.
13078 directed the Labor Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics to address this problem, but in recognition of the great difficulty associated with it, imposed no time line
for developing a reliable measure of unemployment for people with disabilities. Exec.
Order No. 13078, 3 C.F.R. 140 § 2 (f) (1998 Comp.).
17. See supra note 12 (providing the AAA's definition of a covered entity).
18. See, e.g., Re-Charting the Course: First Report of the Presidential Task Force on the
Employment of Adults with Disabilities, Nov. 15, 1998, at 19 available at http://www.ilr.
cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/DisabilitiesAdultEmploy/
DisabilitiesRechartingtheCoursel998.pdf (Executive Summary) ("The Task Force recognizes that many of these multiple barriers to employment are embedded in the public policies of our nation. Too many programs continue an antiquated, paternalistic
attitude about disability in their approach to providing services and supports, rather
than empowering people with disabilities with control and choice in recognition of
their competencies and contributions to the workforce. As a result, the reality in our
nation today is that Americans with disabilities do not have opportunities to pursue the
array of life opportunities and options that are afforded most people without disabilities.") [hereinafter "First Report of the Presidential Task Force"].
19. See infta notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
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executive order departed from the anti-discrimination phase of federal disability policy and commenced a new and distinct phase: the
20
course-correction phase.
The executive order did not purport to map out a thoroughgoing course correction for federal disability policy, however. President Clinton might have justifiably echoed his predecessor Lyndon
Johnson: "A President's hardest task is not to do what is right, but to
know what is right. '2 1 The means to the desired end of greater
employment opportunity for people with disabilities were not entirely clear. As a result, the executive order offered only a policy
skeleton onto which the PTFEAD's members and staff were expected to hang a fleshier agenda for re-engineering federal policy
regarding the employment of adults with disabilities.
For example, the executive order required the PTFEAD to "develop and recommend options to address health insurance coverage as a barrier to employment for people with disabilities";
"analyze State and private disability systems ... and their effect on
Federal programs and employment of adults with disabilities;" and
"analyze youth programs related to employment ... and the outcomes of those programs for young people with disabilities." 22 Yet,
the executive order did not detail the particular problems to be
solved in these arenas, the solutions to be proposed, or even the
specific goals to be met. The only further direction to the PTFEAD
from the executive order, beyond the broad, long-term goal of increasing employment among adults with disabilities to the extent
possible, was a general mandate to "analyze the existing programs
and policies of Task Force member agencies to determine what
20. The executive order also placed employment at the center of the disabilities
agenda. This was not an inevitable choice. The ADA treated employment discrimination as one evil equivalent to the evils of discrimination in public accommodations and
discrimination in transportation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2003) (the ADA is comprised
of three main titles: Employment, Public Services and Public Accommodations). Other
legislative proposals pending at the time of the executive order would have focused on
independent living for people with disabilities and treated expanded employment opMedicaid Community
portunities as an ancillary, if welcome, consequence. See, e.g.,
Attendant Services Act of 1997, H.R. 2020, 105th Cong. (1997).
Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRES21.
IDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON: 1965 9 (1966).
22. Exec. Order No. 13078, 3 C.F.R. 140 (1998 Comp.) at §§1(c)(2),
(c) (3),(c) (7).
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changes, modifications, and innovations may be necessary to remove barriers to work faced by people with disabilities. ' 23
THE COURSE-CORRECTION PHASE:

A

POLITICAL STRATEGY

Executive Order No. 13078 did not merely change the substantive focus of disability policy making. 2 4 It also subtly hinted that a
new strategy was needed to guarantee the success of the coursecorrection phase. This new strategy was rooted in the peculiar history of the anti-discrimination phase's legislative successes. Unlike
the civil rights bills that prohibited discrimination on the basis of
race, the ADA and its predecessors were not the end products of
great and wrenching social transformation. The Rehabilitation
Act's anti-discrimination provisions were mere congressional afterthoughts apparently little understood by their sponsors. 25 As Joseph Shapiro observed not long after the ADA took effect, "disabled
people got their rights without dramatic Freedom Rides, church
bombings, or 'I Have a Dream' speeches to stir the conscience of a
guilty nation. African-Americans had changed a nation's attitudes
and then won civil rights law." 2 6 The result was a "gap between the

newly militant self-perception of disabled people, and the confused,
still stereotypical thinking of the rest of the country." 27 Thus, the
challenge of the course-correction phase was the quintessentially
political task of bridging the gap between existing federal policies,
which largely codified the unreformed thinking of non-disabled
Americans, and the expectations of people with disabilities that the
23.

Id. at § 1(c) (1). Among other process requirements in Section 1 of the execu-

tive order, Section 2 contained several specific directives for particular agencies to cooperate in the creation of reports on subjects identified in Section 1 and other related
topics. Id. at § 2. President Clinton gave the PTFEAD slightly less than four years to
complete its work, although the latter eighteen months of the PTFEAD's life extended
beyond the end of President Clinton's second term in office. Id. at § 1 (d) (2).
24.

President Clinton amended Executive Order No. 13078 on October 25, 2000

to expand the PTFEAD's focus to include youth. Exec. Order No. 13172, 65 Fed. Reg.
64,577 (October 27, 2000).
25.
See RICHARD SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 51-52 (1984).
26. JOSEPH SHAPIRO, No PITY. PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 323-24 (1994).
27.

Id. at 328.
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ADA's promise of equal employment opportunity would be
fulfilled.

28

One important signal of this strategy change came when President Clinton selected the PTFEAD's leadership. President Clinton
chose Tony Coelho to be the PTFEAD's Vice-Chair. 29 At the time,
Coelho was the Chair of the President's Committee for the Employment of People with Disabilities. But Coelho was better known as a
former six-term congressman representing central California. He
had risen to become the third-ranking Democrat in the U.S. House
of Representatives -

the Majority Whip -

after successful service

as the chairman of the House Democrats' campaign and fundraising committee. 30 Even eight years after his departure from Congress, Coelho was still widely acknowledged as one of Washington's
31
leading experts in the art, science, and business of politics.
Coelho's selection intimated that the success of the course-correction phase, and ultimately the employment of adults with disabilities, would depend on politics as much as or more than the
creation of new legal rights and responsibilities enforced through
litigation or government compulsion. This implicit but unmistakable suggestion was surprising for two reasons.
First, Coelho, although a non-lawyer, was closely identified with
the rights-based strategy that characterized the anti-discrimination
phase. In particular, he was the principal author of the U.S. House
32
of Representatives' version of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

At the first meeting of the PTFEAD in April 1998, however, Coelho
disclaimed an unbending loyalty to the anti-discrimination strategy:
With the ADA, we began a transformation of the proverbial ladder of success for some Americans into a ramp of
opportunity for all Americans; yet we would not be here
28. See First Report of the Presidential Task Force, supra note 18.
29. See Exec. Order No. 13078, 3 C.F.R. 140 (1998 Comp.) at Sec. 1(b).
30. See Linda Greenhouse, Men in the News: 3 Democrats Rise in 100th Congress's
House Leadership: Anthony L. Coelho, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1986, at B17.
31.
See, e.g., David A. Vise, Tony Coelho, Soldier of Fortune: He Left Congress and Found
His True Worth, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1994, at Fl. One illustration of this fact is that
Congressman Coelho was chosen by Vice-President A] Gore to chair his unsuccessful
campaign for President. See Todd S. Purdum, It's California or Bust, It Seems in '00 Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1999, at A22.
32. See Tony Coelho, Our Right to Work, OurDemand to be Heard: People with Disabilities, the 2004 Election, and Beyond, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 729, 734 (2004).
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today if the ADA, a piece of civil rights legislation, was the
solution to the employment problems, the problems experienced by millions of people with disabilities through33
out our great country.
In sum, Coelho understood, as President Clinton also apparently did, that the time had arrived for a new phase in disabilities
policy.
Second, the executive order suggested that the President the chief executive officer of the federal executive branch, among
other things - would need skilled political hands to help change
his own government's disability policies. President Clinton's selection of Alexis Herman 34 and Tony Coelho to lead the PTFEAD disclosed his apparent belief that directing his own senior political
appointees in the executive branch to change direction might not
work. In other words, even "knowing what's right" would not be
sufficient. Moving bureaucracies, their associated interests, and
their congressional defenders to adopt and implement more effective policies would require the hands-on leadership of master political tacticians.
President Clinton's course-correction strategy achieved some
successes during the PTFEAD's short life.3 5 For example, President
Clinton re-engineered the federal government's role in the employment of adults with disabilities by issuing Executive Order No.
13163 which directed executive branch agencies and departments
33. Tony Coelho, Remarks for the Inaugural Meeting of the Presidential Task
Force on Employment of Adults with Disabilities (April 22, 1998) (on file with author).
34. Although a long-time expert in workforce matters, Secretary Herman was also
a well-respected political strategist. She had served as the Chief of Staff to the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee and the White House's Director of Public
Liaison before becoming Secretary of Labor. See, e.g., Alison L. Maxwell, Labor Secretary
Willing To Get Dirt Under Her Nails Herman Believes She Can Make A Difference, USA TODAY,
Aug. 28, 2000, at 6B.
35. The PTFEAD effectively ceased functioning on January 21, 2001 after President Bush took office. Although President Bush did not repeal Executive Order No.
13078, the PTFEAD's work was largely folded into the Bush Administration's "New
Freedom Initiative" which purported to continue the course-correction phase in federal
disability policy. See George W. Bush, Editorial, An American Independence Movement; I
Pledge To Uphold And Strengthen The Americans With DisabilitiesAct, PiTTSBURGH POsT-GAZETrE, July, 28, 2000, at A21. By operation of the executive order, the PTFEAD went
out of existence on July 26, 2002. Exec. Order No. 13078, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,111 at
Sec.I(d) (2) (March 13, 1998).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

to hire 100,000 people with disabilities before July 26, 2005.36 On

December 17, 1999, President Clinton signed the Ticket to Work
and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 into law and effected a small-scale re-engineering of the Social Security Disability
Insurance (SSDI) system. 3 7 The "Ticket to Work Act" allows states
to encourage people with disabilities to leave the disability rolls by
assuring access to and funding for job training and accessibility services and continued access to health insurance through Medicaid
or Medicare. 38 In a related effort to increase the employment prospects of SSDI recipients, the Social Security Administration increased by forty percent the amount of money SSDI recipients
could earn without losing their benefits.3 9 Even with these successes and others, however, no fair assessor of the course-correction
phase could argue that it had reached a successful end when Presi40
dent Clinton left office.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PHASE

President Clinton and his Executive Order No. 13078 were not
the only forces effecting a course correction in disability policy during the late 1990s. The Supreme Court had undertaken its own
36.
See Exec. Order No. 13163, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,563 (July 28, 2000).
37.
See Elliot Pisem and Ezra Dyckman, Internal Revenue Code Changes Favor Real
Estate Trusts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 1999, at 5; Barabara Melman, Changes in Social Security
Guidelines Set to Take Effect Soon, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Aug. 13, 2000, at 4.

38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2003).
39. See Substantial Gainful Activity Amounts, 65 Fed. Reg. 82905 (Dec. 29, 2000)
(codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 and 416).
40. Even by its own measures, the PTFEAD did not accomplish everything it had
concluded should be accomplished. For example, the PTFEAD issued a report in 1999
listing more than one dozen recommendations for action. See Re-Charting the Course: If
Not Now, When ?: Second Report of the Presidential Task Force on the Employment of Adults with
Disabilities,Nov. 15, 1999 (Ch.1) at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/key
WorkplaceDocuments/DisabilitiesAdultEmploy/DisabilitiesRechartingTheCoursel999.
pdf. Many of those proposals were never implemented. In addition, many of the
PTFEAD's recommendations in its 1998 report were not implemented. See Re-Charting
the Course: FirstReport of the PresidentialTask Force on the Employment of Adults with Disabilities, Nov. 15, 1998 at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/DisabilitiesAdultEmploy/DisabilitiesRechartingtheCoursel998.pdf; Re-Charting
the Course: If Not Now, When ?: Second Report of the PresidentialTask Force on the Employment of
Adults with Disabilities, Nov. 15, 1999 (Ch.2) at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/
downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/DisabilitiesAdultEmploy/DisabilitiesRecharting
TheCourse1999.pdf.
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effort to reinterpret and dramatically narrow the applicability of the
anti-discrimination phase's signal accomplishment: the Americans
41
with Disabilities Act.

The ADA's authors apparently believed that human variation
does not become "disability" until a human condition interacts with
an environment that will not accommodate it.42 Yet, human variation is endless and workplaces take many and varied physical and
organizational forms. Thus, the ADA's authors could not codify a
static definition of "disability." Instead, the ADA contains a contingent definition of "disability:" "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
43
[an] individual."
For the same reasons, the ADA does not codify a particular
approach to how each worker with a disability should be fitted into
a workplace. Rather, the ADA requires employers to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability ....unless [the

employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the [the
employer]

."44

Most important, the ADA does not specifically define

the two phrases that are most important to the integration of work41. Studies in the late 1990s also suggested that the lower courts showed a surprising degree of hostility to ADA Tide I plaintiffs. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Introduction, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILry RIGHTS 6-8 (Linda
Hamilton Krieger, ed. 2003) (discussing studies by the American Bar Association and
Professor Ruth Colker).
42. See Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: UnreasonableBias or Biased Reasoning?, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note
41 at 26-37 (discussing the ADA's adoption of a "sociopolitical" definition of disability);
see also Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures:Judicial Construction of
the Meaning of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY
RIGHTS, supra note 41 at 124-28 (tracing the history and sources of the ADA's definition
of "disability").
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). The ADA also defines "a record of such an impairment" or "being regarded as having such an impairment" to be sufficient to satisfy
the law's definition of "disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (2000). More precisely, the ADA holds that "[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training and
other terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
The ADA then defines failure to provide reasonable accommodation to be "discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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ers with disabilities - "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship." 45 Instead, the ADA's Title I established a problem-solving approach to the integration of people with disabilities into the
workplace. 46 Rather than mandating particular accommodations,
the ADA requires employers to engage in an "interactive process" in
which their employees with disabilities may propose accommodations and employers may either accept or reject the proposals or
counter-propose alternatives until appropriate and cost-effective ac47
commodations can be found.

When the interactive process fails, however, the task of defining "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" falls to the
courts. And therein lay an opening for an activist Supreme Court
to effectively amend the ADA. By empowering judges to offer their
own definitions of the ADA's critical terms, the problem-solving approach propounded by the ADA's authors contained the seeds of a
48
dramatic narrowing of the ADA's scope.

45.
Section 101 (9) offers only an illustrative list of "reasonable accommodations."
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). Section 101 (10) (A) defines "undue hardship" as "an
action requiring significant difficulty or expense," when considered in light of four contingent factors set forth in section 101(10)(B). 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000). Congress rejected two amendments to the definition of "undue hardship" that would have
defined the phrase as any cost that exceeds five or ten percent of an employer's net
profits. See RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 175 (2001).
46. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989) ("A problem-solving approach should be
used to identify the particular tasks or aspects of the work environment that limit performance and to identify possible accommodations... employers first will consult with
and involve the individual with a disability in deciding on the appropriate accommodation."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990) (same).
47.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (3) (2003) (EEOC regulations on the interactive process); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2003) (interpretive guidance stating that the
employer "must" engage in the interactive process).
48. Matthew Diller properly warned against blaming the ADA's authors for the
Supreme Court's reinterpretations of the ADA: "While the courts certainly have seized
on statutory language to create imposing obstacles for plaintiffs, the key phrases in the
ADA are, ultimately, vague. Vague language can be interpreted broadly, as well as narrowly. Despite judicial claims that the courts are simply applying the 'plain meaning' of
the statute, the courts are affirmatively choosing narrow readings over broad ones, even
in the face of expansive administrative interpretation and strong evidence that Congress intended the statute to be interpreted expansively." Matthew Diller, JudicialBacklash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA:
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 41 at 63.
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Employers viewed the ADA's definitions of "disability," "reasonable accommodations," and "undue hardship" with alarm. From
their perspective, the statute imposed no explicit limits on employers' obligations to accommodate employees with disabilities beyond
the loosely defined protection against "undue hardship."49 Courts
of appeals decisions holding that only accommodations "costs
which are substantially disproportionate to benefits" would impose
an "undue hardship" likely reinforced employers' fears that Title I
mandated unpredictable, diverse, and expensive accommodations
of any person with a disability wielding an employment application.5 0 To avoid this seemingly unbridled accommodations mandate, employers asked the courts to shut the door to the ADA's
protected class.
The Supreme Court has largely complied. 51 In a trilogy of
53
cases - Sutton v. United Airlines,52 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
and Murphy v. United Parcel Service54 - the Court excluded a large
number of people from the ADA's protections by holding that efforts undertaken by people with disabilities to "correct" the effects
of an impairment must be taken into account in courts' determinations of whether that impairment "substantially limits" a "major life
activity." 55 The Sutton Court also held that workers with disabilities
49. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 45, at 163-64, 200-01 (discussing employers' lobbying efforts during Congress' consideration of the ADA and quoting employers' advocates on subsequent judicial decisions).
50. See Borkowski v. Valley Central School Dist., 63 F. 3d 131 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(holding that an undue hardship exists when the costs to the employer of providing the
employee with an accommodation substantially outweigh the benefits of the accommodation); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't. of Admin., 44 F. 3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995) (providing that the employee must show that an accommodation is both effective and
proportional to costs to establish that it is reasonable, then employer may defend on
grounds of undue hardship if the employer can show that "an accommodation reasonable to a normal employer would break him").
51. In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court widened access to the ADA's protected class by holding that "reproduction" is a major life activity which asymptomatic
HIV "substantially limits." 524 U.S. 624, 647 (1998). The Court also offered an inclusive
interpretation of the definition of "disability" in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661
(2001). Yet, Bragdon and Martin proved to be exceptions to the Rehnquist Court's ADA
jurisprudence.
52. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
53. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
54. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
55. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488; Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
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are not substantially limited in the major life activity of "working"
56
unless they have been excluded from a "broad class of jobs."
Thus, even workers with impairments that substantially limit their
ability to perform their jobs may not have a "disability."
In Toyota Motor Manufacturingv. Williams,57 the Supreme Court
used similar logic to further narrow the entranceway into the ADA's
protected class. The Williams Court held that "the central inquiry"
when determining whether an individual's impairment substantially
limits a major life activity "must be whether the claimant is unable

to perform the variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives,
not whether the claimant is unable to perform the tasks associated
with her specific job." 58 Thus, a worker whose severe carpal tunnel
syndrome and tendinitis starkly limited her work and home lives
was not substantially limited in the major life activity of "performing
manual tasks" because she could brush her teeth, tend her garden,

59
and fix her breakfast.
The Supreme Court did not limit itself to using the ADA's ambiguous text as a means to narrowing the statute's reach. In Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,60 the Court relied on its newly
rejuvenated federalism jurisprudence to strike down employment
discrimination claims for damages by state employees with disabilities. The Court held that Congress had exceeded its authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by abrogating the
sovereign immunity of states and subjecting them to employment
discrimination claims for damages by employees with disabilities in
Title I of the ADA. 6 1

56. Sutton, 537 U.S. at 491 (the Court assumed without concluding that "working"
is a "major life activity").
57. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
58. Id. at 200.
59. Id. at 202.
60. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
61.
Id. at 374. Garrettwas one of several decisions in which the Supreme Court, by
the narrowest margin, used the Eleventh Amendment to expand state immunity from
congressional power. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S.
743 (2002) (Shipping Act); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). But see Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972 (2003) (Family and Medical Leave Act).
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Title I plaintiffs able to squeeze into the ADA's judicially
streamlined protected class faced further obstacles erected by the
Supreme Court. For example, in US Airways v. Barnett,6 2 the Supreme Court manufactured out of whole cloth a new defense for
employers seeking to avoid accommodating their employees with
disabilities. After Barnett, any accommodation that violates an employer's unilaterally imposed seniority system would be considered
"ordinarily unreasonable" unless the employee/plaintiff with a disability can demonstrate "special circumstances." 63 This implied "seniority system defense" finds no support in the text of the ADA and
offers broader protection to employers than express "bona fide seniority system" defenses established by other employment discrimination statutes. 64 The Supreme Court also gave an expansive
definition to the so-called 'job-related/business necessity defense"
65
in Chevron v. Echazabal.
Thus, the central accomplishment of the anti-discrimination
phase -

the ADA -

faced stern judicial attack in the waning years

of the Clinton Administration. And the work of the course-correction phase of federal disability policy had barely begun.
THE "COELHO CHALLENGE"

On October 24, 2003, Tony Coelho addressed a large audience
at New York Law School at the invitation of New York Law School's
Labor & Employment Law Program. His address commemorated
National Disability Employment Awareness Month. The philosophy
of New York Law School's Labor & Employment Law Program is
that law derives principally from politics and policy, rather than objective and neutral reasoning. Thus, it seemed appropriate to commence its 2003-04 Law & Public Policy Events Series with an address
62. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
63. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 403. For a more expansive discussion of U.S. Airways v.
Barnett, see Seth D. Harris, Re-thinking the Economics of Discrimination:US Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IowA L. REv. 123
(2003).
64. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000) (Title VII permits employers to "apply
different . . .terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system").
65. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
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by one of the nation's leading experts on politics and disability
policy.
Congressman Coelho offers a unique perspective on disability
policy. In addition to his painful personal experiences, 66 Coelho
played a leading role in the latter stage of the anti-discrimination
phase and an equally leading role in the course-correction phase of
disability policy. His unique status made him an eyewitness to and a
possible bridge between these two phases. In addition, Coelho's
historical importance gives immense authority to his vision of the
road ahead.
Congressman Coelho's address -

reproduced below -

sets

forth an agenda befitting the unique historical role of the speaker.
First, the address advocates conserving the anti-discrimination edifice undermined by the Supreme Court at the end of the 20th Century. Congressman Coelho's proposal for an ADA Restoration Bill
is central to defending the most important achievement of the antidiscrimination phase and one of Congressman Coelho's greatest
legislative accomplishments.
Second, the address promotes a revivification of the course-correction phase which President Clinton commenced by issuing Executive Order No. 13078. In particular, Congressman Coelho
demands the expansion of federal employment and contracting opportunities for people with disabilities and the reform of the JavitsWagner-O'Day program which sets aside certain federal contracts
for the employers of people with severe disabilities. He also proposes comprehensive reform of the SSDI system to build on the
promise of the Ticket to Work Act. We can assume that the
PTFEAD's agenda would have included these proposals had it survived the 2000 presidential election. In this respect, Congressman
Coelho seeks to finish the course-correction phase's unfinished
business.
Finally, the address tantalizingly hints at the need for a new
phase of disability employment policy premised on the idea that
private parties must do more than merely refrain from discriminating against people with disabilities. Congressman Coelho's proposal that the next President require employers doing business with
66. See Tony Coelho, Our Right to Work, Our Demand to be Heard: Peoplewith Disabilities, the 2004 Election, and Beyond, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 729, 740-41 (2004).

20041

INTRODUCTION: "COELHO CHALLENGE"

the federal government to engage in affirmative action for people
with disabilities moves beyond the course-correction phase's focus
on the federal government's responsibility for the low employment
rate among people with disabilities. It implicitly suggests that even
a thorough re-engineering of federal policy, building on a restored
anti-discrimination strategy, will not be enough to achieve substantially increased employment opportunity for adults with disabilities.
A new strategy of expanded private responsibility will also be
needed.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Congressman Coelho's
address is its intended audience. This is not a typical law review
article directed at scholars, courts, and lawyers. Congressman
Coelho self-consciously and directly summons the disability community to take on the challenge of forcing change through the political process. He also challenges the 2004 presidential candidates to
draw on the potential vote-getting power of the disability community by endorsing the agenda set forth in the address. In essence,
Congressman Coelho seeks to answer the challenge described by
Joseph Shapiro to forge the political support and power necessary
to transform not only policy, but society.
At the time of this writing, this so-called "Coelho Challenge"
has been widely adopted by disability organizations and endorsed
by most of the 2004 presidential candidates. There is every reason
to believe that this address will play an important role in shaping
progressive disability policy at the federal level for many years to
come.

